Religion Forming Society: Ties between Feudalism, Religion, and Eastern Thought

This is a paper I wrote for Western History class. The assignment was to read a set of about 4 texts, and come to a conclusion regarding the Franks from about 500-1000 CE, and how religion influenced governmental development in light of a chaper from Li's book regarding the nonexclusivity of eastern religion. I don't think the bit of Chinese text shows up. Oh Well.


Note that the assumption behind the assignment was to show why nonexclusivist religious thought, like that which exists in the far east, would be different than Christian exclusivist religious thought from Europe. The obvious conclusion from the assigned readings seemed a bit obvious, and after a bit more reading, seemed simplistic and not borne out by facts. It also conveniently says that Christianity and politics mix even worse than other religions, and seems to be (if I'm not reading too muich into it, which I don't think I am) and implicit criticism of George W. Bush and his Christian government. I decided to write from a slightly different viewpoint, about a slightly broader topic, and debunk the obvious conclusion.


Here we go.




The effects of religion on the formation of any society are multifaceted, and no-one doubts their importance, but the relationship between a specific type of religion or religious organization and the structure of the governance of a society are still somewhat ambiguous. To be more specific, there is a relationship between the existence of, or lack of, religious plurality and the development of the governmental structure that accompanies it . We can see from the religious philosophies and the development of the power structures in both feudal France and China that religious culture is a factor which influences the formation of the structure and role of government in a fashion that might not be expected.


To understand the similarities and differences between the two cultures, we must examine the way in which they developed. The basic outline of these cultural evolutions can be thought of as occurring in three stages. The previous structure is destroyed, and a different one comes to replace it. As this next stage begins, there is a need to co-opt aspects of the previous government. Parenthetically, this reflects the structure of the previous government, which is apropos because it was developed to deal with exactly the same problems that the new government faces. The new structure, which in both these cases is religiously based, slowly changes to partially reflect the old one. The use of the previous governmental structure becomes absorbed into the new one, and a hybridized system emerges. In both the kingdom of the Franks and China, these structures were established, and remained so stable that only in modern times, with the advent of representative democracies, were the last vestiges of these systems finally purged.


The evolution of France from the fall of Rome until the Capetian Dynasty and the Formation of the Holy Roman Empire is an excellent and informative example about how a strong religion, especially a monolithic one, can be efficacious in the formation of a strong central government. In the wake of the fall of Rome and the dissolution of Roman power, new religious forces were able to take an expanding role in the power structure of the society. Despite the assertion that Christianity has “ritual[s…] that united people beyond the traditional barriers of social class, education, and gender,” (Kagan, 209) the church was the “[lone] effective hierarchical administration… staffed by the best educated minds in Europe.” (ibid.) Even the church, supposedly acting as a great leveler, was simply mirroring the only known structure, which was hierarchical, that would deal with a system of the complexity of what amounted to an empire.



We see that the origins of both Church and Merovingian society in France were based on the previous, Roman structure. By "absorbing the mechanism of provincial Roman administration... [they] establish[ed] legitimate [rule... and] enforc[ed] Roman law." (Geary, 43) This was made possible partially by the near homogeneity of the beliefs and preexisting structures from Roman times. The Franks added to this empire their "cherished feuds, kinship structures, and personal alliances." (Geary, 44) The largest change was one that bridged the gap between the barbarism and essential dispersed nature of the Germanic tribes and the monolithic centralized civilization of Rome: "the profound localism was characteristic of the Merovingian period... [which] also [led to] the shift in religious authority from the urban world of the bishops to the rural monastery." (Geary, 45) And seemingly despite the monolithic church, the fragmented political structure dictated to some extent the structure of religious organization during this period. This led to a sort of "counter transference," where the church received parts of the structure of the society it was within. The religious and secular leaders both simply co-opted what they could of the Roman structure, and used their tribal influence to moderate the system to their own ends.



It was only as religion began to mandate obeisance that the Carolingian dynasty began its ascent. The Arnulfings took power as a product of the bureaucracy established by the Merovingians, and in order to establish their credentials, looked towards the only power that could possibly establish them other than the physical power they already possessed, that being the religious mandate of the church. After Childeric, known as the phantom king, was placed as a titular head, Pippin lacked only approval from the church to officially usurp the throne. His appeal was at first for legitimacy, and should in no way be construed as obeisance to the church, but rather a further usurpation of power, one that this time included even the church in its grasp.



The importance of the origins of the structure cannot be overstated: the structure was synthesized from the Roman Imperial law and the Christian Church, whose structure was itself derived from the Roman Empire. In the beginning of the transformation, during early Merovingian rule, “there is... some realignment of spiritual values" (Wallace-Hadrill, 106) which reflect the barbarian religion of the Franks. Later, as the governing class began to formalize their power structure, they needed to do so in a way acceptable to the church. This meant basing the traditional familial structure on Roman law, with benificium and precarium as the legal vehicles used. (Ganshof, 11)



Of course, the church would not play steward to the Merovingian dynasty indefinitely. Imperial structures in the Roman mold are exclusionist, and so the parties involved each tried seeking supremacy. The culmination of this relationship occurred when, by mutual consent, Charlemagne was crowned imperator Romanorum, making him the proxy for the church as ruler, neatly solving the dilemma. Later this was modified to be only gobernans Imperium, but originally he was anointed a clear heir to the Roman Empire, trans-substantiated into a Holy Roman Empire by this act of the church. The formation of the entire complication of the feudal system followed: Roman common law, which was acceptable to the church, was applied to Frankish governance. While important, this system is a product of the forces outlined. As Tierney put it, they were "trying to create a coherent legal system out of the prevailing pattern of behavior," and it is a combination of Roman law and barbaric practice. (Tierney and Painter, 158) The basics seemed to have been a veneer over the Roman Empire laid by the barbarian tribes attempting to retain their familial ties, and evolved to allow retention of the personal relationship within a Roman-like political structure.



We saw the developmental trinity in Europe around Christian ideals, that of a government falling, a new one which co-opts previous structures forming, and finally the emergence of a hybrid. The same occurred in China. In China, the Zhou period was the period in which “a new order began to emerge,” leading to the formation of the unified states. (Fairbank, 54) The concept of feudal roles was in fact pioneered in China centuries before its renaissance in Europe. This was, in fact, the previous system that the Chinese empire emerged from. As the Zhou period ended, and the Qin dynasty emerged, the philosophy centering on governance that had emerged during the so called "hundred schools of thought" was tested, and put into place by its believers. This government was feudal, to some extent, except that the structure was significantly more bureaucratic and less relationship based than the feudal one in Europe would later be.



In contrast to Europe, Chinese religion was not imported, nor did people need to convert, or throw out old ideas completely. In fact, there was a reverence for the old: "respect for the old became a central feature of the Chinese cultural tradition." (Billington, 121) In sum, there was very little counter transference that occurred into Confucianism as the ideas were brought into use for government, and the government, once established, did not need to evolve.



It is important to note that this new order was not despite the religious revival that had just occurred or even parallel to it, but because of it. The entire governmental structure was rebuild around religious ideals - primarily Legalist and Confucian ones, but the nonexclusive religious climate meant that other ideas were included as well. Of course, Confucianism was a religion based on Chinese governance, and so was much more directly applicable to governance than Christianity, and Legalism has been classified more often as political theory than as a religion. As the Qin (also spelled Ch'in) dynasty emerged, following a state based on Legalist doctrine, it emerged from a slightly modified bureaucratic feudalism , and easily a millennium before the first hints of such a system would appear in Europe. This feudalism, and more specifically the rigid hierarchy and bureaucracy, was to a large extent embraced by Confucius, himself once a civil servant (Burlington, 119) as the epitome of proper government. To quote Confucius himself, in response to the Duke Qing of Qi asking about government (in The Analects, Book XII, Chapter XI), "君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子" meaning: "[There is government] when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son." The role of individuals in the system was in many ways even more fixed than that of European feudalism.



Of course, the Qin dynasty was no bastion of tolerance, and had Confucian thought banned. It was instead a precursor to the Han dynasty, which capitalized on the unification brutally brought about by the Qin dynasty. The Qin dynasty also abolished feudal alliances, and standardized the entire country, allowing for development by more civilized regimes later. After the Qin dynasty, the Han took power, and codified and made permanent most of the structure. As in Europe, once the system was established as stable then the relationship moved to a more direct power for the ruler. The Qin, and later the Han Dynasties, based much of their philosophy Legalism, with Han incorporating more Taoism, as well as strong currents of a revived Confucianism, recovering from being banned and nearly destroyed during the Qin Dynasty. As the empires progressed, the fengjian (Bureaucratic Feudalism) turned into junxian (Bureaucratic Centralization,) (Fairbank, 56) which parallels Europe, with the addition of a bureaucratic element (and some Chinese terminology.) This bureaucracy was constituted so that policy was difficult to change. China never was able to develop the "workable relationship between bureaucrats and policymakers" (Strayer, 110) that Europe eventually settled into. The bureaucracy was expanded to be able to withstand any changes in government, and it indeed lasted millennia, through the communist revolution, and in large part until today.



After noticing the structure of these dynasties, however, it is instructive to broaden our scope. As Li points out in his introduction, "sometimes historic accidents will determine more than anything else what the future will be," (Li, 1) so we look at the philosophies upon which governments are based. These philosophies, mostly Confucianism and Legalism, were conceived in a period remarkable similar to that of Europe after the fall of Rome. As Finer puts it, "the old order was in full retreat, a new one not yet born." (456) Instead of tacitly borrowing idea from the previous governmental structure, Confucius unabashedly asserted that he was modeling his new government on the old. He claimed that since people didn't change, governments should not have to either, and that all that would be required was to learn what the emperors of the golden age had done, and copy "the maxims of proper government." (Finer, 458) It is about tailoring actions to the needs of the times, and focuses almost completely on governmental, and not spiritual, concerns. Legalism is even more a governmental philosophy, but in this case one that is almost diametrically opposed to Confucianism. The basis is one of an unambiguous code of law, where everything is spelled out, because "the Legalists viewed the mass of humanity as irrevocably stupid and base, and susceptible only to the carrot and the stick." (Finer, 467) Taoism, as compared to the other two religions being discussed, is decidedly familiar: it is theist, though not monotheist, and involves specific rituals. It also focuses on philosophy of living life, and not on what happens afterward, keeping a focus for religion on practical problems and beliefs.



Given the complete antithetical natures of these religious philosophies, it is surprising that most dynastic governments of China combined them. This is what Li was discussing, in a different context, when he talked about exclusive versus nonexclusive religion and its implications on modern democracy in China. Clearly, however, the implications for government are not as straightforward as a dilemma between pluralism and feudalism. The first problem with this simplistic approach is that even though the paradigms are not exclusive as religions, they are constructed along clear authoritarian lines. Strayer points out, "Organization alone could not... produce the modern state," (Strayer, 107) but in Feudalism, the system could evolve because the roles eventually would allow progress; it gave "lesser vassals a chance to participate in the work of government as judges and administrators." (Strayer, 106) In contrast Li states that, "in Confucianism people are essentially unequal because of their social roles.” (Li, 177) and regarding not Taoism specifically, but Chinese religion in general, Billington prefaces his discussion of Taoism with a warning that "Chinese humanism sets greater store on the relationship between individuals and their fellows: social empathy rather than personal development is their overriding aim." (Billington, 87) Clearly, the philosophical exclusivity of the different Chinese approaches had less impact than the fact that they gave control to the elite, and allowed for government along these bureaucratic lines.


Both systems were, as Tierney said about feudalism, "the natural product of the customs and conditions of the time." (Tierney and Painter, 159) The key differences stem from the types of governments that have arisen. In the case of Europe, the stifling nature of the religion and government led to the eventual revision and revolts that led to modern democracy. In China, the eventual end of their system was the arrival of a European culture informing them they were centuries behind the time in the art of governance. In the conclusion lies the key to understanding origin; in many ways, Chinese philosophy and religion was so oriented towards this world, and one's place in the world, that the chaos of the west, despite its long dark age, overtook it.


The difference between these two forms of governance lies mainly in the cultural and religious background that existed. The key end result in both cases, as we see, is that once a coherent system of government is established, religion is the vehicle, and not the controller, and the rulers who create the system are insulated from the majority of the religious implications regardless.








Billington, Ray. Understanding Eastern Philosophy. London, GBR: Routledge, 1997.


Fairbank, John King. “The First Unification: Imperial Confucianism.” China: A New History, Pg 46-71. The Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1992


Finer, S.E. The History of Government from the Earliest Times I: Ancient Monarchies and Empires Pg 442-72. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999


Ganshof, F.L. Feudalism Trans. Philip Grierson. Harper and Row, 1964


Geary, Patrick. "Merovingian Society." The Middle Ages, Volume II: Readings in Medieval History ed. Tierney, Brian. Pg 37-47. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1999.


Heinlein, Robert A. "Glory Road" Baen New York, 1963.


Li, Chenyang. The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy. State University of New York, Albany, 1999


Strayer, Joseph R. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970


Tierney, Brian. "The Frankish-Papal Alliance." The Middle Ages, Volume I: Sources of Medieval History ed. Tierney, Brian. Pg 81-88. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1999. (cited as Tierney)


Tierney, Brian and Painter, Sydney. Western Europe in the Middle Ages 300-1475. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1999 (Cited as Tierney and Painter)


Wallace-Hadrill, J.M. "The Conversion of the Franks." The Other Side of Western Civilization: Readings in Everyday Life, Volume 1: The Ancient World to the Reformation Pg. 97-106. Harcourt, Inc. Orlando, Florida, 1973